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SECRET

GERMAN COMMENTS ON U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY

US diplomatic cable 06BERLIN3059 · Germany Berlin · 2006-10-20 17:34 · Read at WikiLeaks PlusD »

Reference ID06BERLIN3059
Created2006 October 20, 17:34 (Friday)
OriginGermany Berlin
CountryGermany
ClassificationSECRET
ToCentral Intelligence Agency; Department of Commerce; Department of Energy; Joint Chiefs of Staff; National Security Council; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); RUCUSTR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE; Secretary of Defense; Secretary of State; United Nations (Geneva); United Nations (New York); United Nations (Vienna); White House
TAGSGM - Germany PARM - Political Affairs--Arms Controls and Disarmament
Character count5,528

Cable text

SECRET S E C R E T BERLIN 003059 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/AGS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 10/31/2007 TAGS: PARM, GM SUBJECT: GERMAN COMMENTS ON U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY REF: SECSTATE 167334 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta , for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (U) Please see the action request in paragraph 9. 2. (S) Summary: Global Affairs officer briefed German officials in Bonn on the U.S. National Space Policy October 16. Although the German officials appreciated the information, they also expressed some reservations. In sum, they contended that: 1) Germany, unlike the United States, is open to a new Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty and to limiting the weaponization of space; 2) the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, though preventing the deployment of WMD in outer space, might be inadequate to prevent the weaponization of space; 3) the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) program might constitute weaponization of space; 4) the USG might be overlooking the potential for a space arms race with China; 5) the U.S. National Space Policy's emphasis on U.S. leadership is not conducive to promoting international partnerships; and 6) the United States protects its domestic space industry at the expense of partnerships with foreign entities. Lastly, the German officials asked for responses to queries requesting the U.S. stance on the accidental release of radioactivity in the event of a failure of a nuclear-powered space vehicle and regarding U.S. plans for the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). End Summary. 3. (S) Global Affairs officer met Dr. Karl-Friedrich Nagel, Office Director of the Space Program General Issues Division in the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi); Dr. Klaus Keller, desk officer of BMWi's Space Program General Issues Division; Jacob Stuebig, desk officer of the BMWi's Space Program Projects and Applications Division; and Marc Haese, International Cooperation officer in the German Aerospace Center (DLR), at the BMWi in Bonn October 16. 4. (S) Nagel raised question about the reasons for the USG opposition to a PAROS treaty; emboff responded drawing on reftel points that the USG considers a new arms control treaty for outer space unnecessary because there is no arms race in space. Nagel also asked whether the USG foresees a future arms race with China and therefore might want to consider concluding a treaty to prevent such an eventuality. He noted that Germany too favors guaranteed space access and also said any weaponization would be a threat to the peaceful use of space. In response to the point that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty rendered any new treaties redundant, Nagel acknowledged that although the treaty had prevented the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, it would not necessarily prevent weaponization of space. Heller asked whether the U.S. NMD program amounts to a weaponization of space, to which emboff noted that the NMD is purely defensive and should not be considered as weaponization. 5. (S) The German Aerospace Center's International Cooperation officer Marc Haese raised a question of whether the U.S. space policy's emphasis on U.S. leadership in space is the best basis for forming international partnerships. Emboff noted the importance of partnerships in exploring space and that Germany is one of the most important. Haese and Heller argued, however, that the USG only values partnerships out of self-interest. They said the United States has not been interested in partnerships in situations where Europe has different goals. For instance, they said that the United States tends to focus on large endeavors, such as manned missions to the Moon and Mars, while the Europeans pursue more modest scientific missions, such as probes of asteroids. Emboff noted the United States and Europe can complement each other in joint missions, such as with the Cassini-Huygens mission to Saturn, in which NASA provided the launch vehicle and the European Space Agency (ESA) supplied the probe. 6. (S) The German officials also argued that the U.S. space market is closed to foreign competition. Haese claimed Germany has superior robotics and laser optical equipment, for instance, but the USG is only willing to give contracts to U.S. firms. Haese said Germany was willing to contribute re-entry vehicles to international space projects, but that the USG awarded a new contract to Boeing instead. Emboff pointed out that the new U.S. space policy provides for using commercial space capabilities and services when suitable for USG requirements, including from foreign providers. When Heller urged the United States to open its satellite market to foreign competitors, emboff cited the new U.S. space policy's commitment to the commercial sector and suggested that Europeans could compete in it. 7. (S) Heller asked questions about the U.S. space policy's entry on space nuclear power. He queried whether the USG had considered altering the minimum threshold of radioactivity released in the case of a launch mishap and said the German Government would oppose the lowering of this threshold. 8. (S) Finally, Haese asked what the latest U.S. plans are for partners in the proposed Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). 9. (U) Post would appreciate guidance to respond to the queries raised in paragraphs 7 and 8. KOENIG

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