(EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) IED EXPLOSION RPT (Improvised Explosive Device (IED)) PSD/-%%% CAV IVO (ROUTE ): %%% INJ/DAM

/ : %%%\012\012\012\012WHO: PSD/-%%% CAV\012\012WHEN: 121240NOV09\012\012WHERE: Ninewah Province, Mosul, north-west of %%% village\012\012WHAT:IED DET-Confirmed (PSD/-%%% CAV) -Ineffective\012\012HOW: At 121240NOV09, %%%/A/-%%% CAV reports an IED detonation on RTE %%% north west of %%% village . %%%/A/-%%% CAV was conducting movement to JSS IT-%%% to replace %%%/A/-%%% CAV on JSS Security when the patrol reported an IED DET. The IED detonated on a the lead MRAP of %%%/A/-%%% CAV on the shoulder of the east bound %%% no CAS and shrapnel to the front windshield of the MRAP. EOD arrived on site and described the IED as 5lbs UBE with a PIR initiation system consisting of %%% each cell phone, %%% each %%% battery, %%% each %%% DTMF board, and %%% PIR. Assessment is that the Rhino on the lead vehicle initiated the PIR sensor. \012\012UPDATE: At 121255NOV09 %%%/A/-%%% CAV reported the IED detonated in front of the lead vehicle as a result of the rhino. SWT team was diverted to the site to provide air support and search for a possible trigger man. %%%/A/-%%% CAV cordon off the area and requested EOD. At %%%, EOD was notified and dispatched to the site with //-%%% CAV providing their escort.\012\012UPDATE: At 121416NOV09 EOD arrived on site at %%% performed PBA looked for a secondary IED. EOD located a second IED at %%% EOD requested a blast window. %%% blast window was %%%, blast window was cleared at %%%. EOD looked for further IEDs. EOD reported that %%%/A/-%%% CAV was traveling down RTE %%% when an IED detonated on shoulder of the EAST bound . %%% no BDA reported. Team Leader determined IED to consist of approximately 5lbs UBE with a PIR initiation system consisting of %%% each cell phone, %%% each %%% battery, %%% each %%% DTMF board, and %%% PIR. Team Leader cleared area. No further explosive hazards found. \012\012BDA: 1x MRAP with minor shrapnel damaged to the front windshield.\012\012S2 Assessment: Attacks along RTE %%% are uncommon. The last attack was on %%% OCT %%%, an IED was found at %%%, north side of road. That IED was a metal box, crush wire, washing machine timer, %%% battery, circuit board, project box, -%%% LBs UBE. Both IEDs were victim operated, indicating that the insurgents were likely not close up. This attack is likely an attempt to reduce USF/ISF freedom of movement. RTE %%% is an important road between RTE %%% and RTE %%%, and south of insurgent lines of supply.\012\012EOD Assessment: Team -%%% responded to a PBA IVO %%% ISO PSD -%%% CAV. Team arrived on scene and set up safe area IVO %%%. PSD -%%% CAV was traveling down RTE %%% when an IED detonated on shoulder of the EAST bound . %%% no BDA reported. Team Leader determined IED to consist of approximately 5lbs UBE with a PIR initiation system consisting of %%% each cell phone, %%% each %%% battery, %%% each %%% DTMF board, and %%% PIR. Team Leader cleared area. No further explosive hazards found. All components were collected by WIT %%% for further investigation.\012\012REPORT STATUS: \012///closed///%%%\012\012